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A B S T R A C T
This paper situates concepts of energy consumption within the context of growing research on embodied
emissions. Using the UK as a case study I unpack the global socio-economic and ecological inequalities inherent
in the measurement of greenhouse gas emissions on a territorial basis under the international climate change
framework. In so doing, I problematise questions of distribution, allocation and responsibility with regards to the
pressing need to reduce global GHG emissions and the consumption that generates them. I challenge the dis-
proportionate emphasis that energy policy places on supply as opposed to demand, as well as its overriding focus
on the national scale. Consequently I argue that any low carbon transition, in addition to a technological process,
is also a geographical one that will involve the reconﬁguration of "current spatial patterns of economic and social
activity" (Bridge et al., 2013:331), as well as relationships both within countries and regions and between them.
1. Introduction
In what Bradshaw ([1]:12) refers to as the diﬀerence between in-
dustrial production and domestic consumption, wealthy countries have
to a large extent exported or outsourced their climate and energy crisis to
low and middle-income countries, deliberately or otherwise. Broadly
speaking, while GHG emissions have stabilised in developed countries,
they are growing in developing countries [2]. Bohm [3] describes this
phenomenon as ‘carbon colonialism’ and Oxfam [4] as ‘extreme carbon
inequality’, estimating that half of the world’s population, approximately
3.5 billion people, of which the majority in regions most vulnerable to
climate change, emit only about 10% of total global emissions attributed
to individual consumption. In contrast, approximately 50% of the world’s
greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) can be attributed to consumption by the
world’s richest 10 per cent, with the average carbon footprint of the
richest one per cent being 175 times higher than that of the poorest 10
per cent ([4]:1). As this paper explores, the nature of this distribution
constitutes a case of ‘ecologically unequal exchange’ [5].
The term ‘embodied emissions’ [6–8] is used here to refer to the
approximately one quarter of global GHG emissions embodied within
goods, services and commodities imported and consumed by the
world’s high-income consumers [9]. Related terms include ‘consump-
tion-based emissions’, ‘embodied energy’ and ‘embodied carbon’. This
paper explores the ecological and socio-economic inequalities inherent
within this structural conﬁguration and argues that embodied emissions
are a fundamental yet largely overlooked aspect of energy policy and
climate change mitigation. Not least, the global commitment made at
the UNFCCC conference in Paris in December 2015 is too ambitious to
be achieved without addressing them [10]. Secondly, an exploration
into consumption-based emissions unearths “large social and political
patterns of inequality” [11] within and between nations, and between
generations [12].
While energy consumption is generally associated with measureable
units for the purposes of electricity, heating and transport, including
kWh, joules, gallons, tonnes of oil equivalent and litres, this paper
problematises a much less visible and less quantiﬁable aspect. That is,
the embodiment of energy and its associated emissions within goods,
services and commodities consumed by industry, commerce, the
household and the individual. In particular the paper asks: what key
theoretical approaches enable an analysis of the inequalities inherent in
embodied emissions? What are the problems inherent in their mea-
surement? How, if at all, are consumption-based emissions accounted
for in policy, and what are the challenges in allocating responsibility for
them?
Academic research and policy interventions to reduce energy de-
mand has failed to account for the complexity of economic systems
(Sorrell 2014:75), including how energy is embodied within circuits of
global capital, industrial infrastructures and systems of production and
consumption [14,11,15]. With this in mind, I situate consumption-
based emissions within the theoretical context of ecologically unequal
exchange. Doing so raises questions over how the increasingly popular
and ubiquitous concept of the low-carbon or energy ‘transition’ (which
involves a shift away from fossil fuels towards cleaner energy supplies
coupled with increased eﬃciency in use and demand reduction) found
within the sphere of academia [16], policy [17], industry [18] and civil
society [19] should be conceptualised and implemented.
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This research uses the UK as a poignant example: while it has one of
the least energy-intensive economies in the developed world, in part
due to the decline of its industrial sector in recent decades, the country
has one of the highest net imports of emissions in the world and is
among the highest in terms of per capita emissions [20]. Yet there is
limited acknowledgement that the bulk of energy consumed by
households in the UK is in fact “embodied in non-energy goods and
services” ([13]:77). As Bridge [14] argues, the consumption of energy
in high-income contexts has been ‘dematerialised’ not only via elec-
triﬁcation or gasiﬁcation but also the import of consumer goods such as
cars and fridges in which energy-intensive intermediate products such
as steel, plastics, cement, and aluminium are incorporated and in-
dustrial infrastructure such as roads and buildings in which signiﬁcant
amounts of GHG emissions are embodied. In each case, the small-scale
and large-scale consumer has been removed from the numerous and
signiﬁcant material inputs and processes, which include not only en-
ergy and natural resource extraction but also labour. Consequently, and
as this paper concludes, a deeper understanding is needed of how en-
ergy and its associated emissions are embodied within “the context of a
chain of processes and structures” [21].
The theoretical approach of this paper draws from two main bodies
of literature: ecologically unequal exchange (e.g [5,22]), and con-
sumption-based emissions accounting (e.g [23,7]). While the former is
relatively theoretical and sits within the overlap of political ecology,
ecological economics and Marxist political economy, the latter is sta-
tistically-informed and draws from climate science, engineering and
emissions modelling. These two bodies of literature come from very
diﬀerent disciplines and are rarely linked directly, with a possible key
tension between them being that the latter is evidence-driven and
problem-oriented and by implication leans towards a more pragmatic
and policy response, while the former is more analytically focussed and
concerned with theoretical nuance and historical exploration. In linking
these literatures and while accepting inevitable limitations, I hope to
enrich both perspectives whilst speaking to audiences on both sides.
Not least, both call for a greater understanding of cross border material
resource ﬂows and the global distribution of energy consumption and
associated emissions. Responding to this call, I further draw on con-
tributions from economic and human geography which emphasise the
role of global interdependencies and the need for a more spatial and
relational understanding of energy production and consumption [24].
In bringing together such literatures, I advocate for a creative synthesis
of various traditions rather than a concise ‘reconciliation’ between
them.
Empirically, the research draws from a desk-based analysis of grey
literature, including reports from UK government departments such as
the former Departments for Energy and Climate Change (DECC) and
Business Innovation and Skills (DBIS), many of whose functions were
taken over the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
(BEIS) established in July 2016, and the Department for Environment,
Food and Rural Aﬀairs (DEFRA); parliamentary bodies such as the UK
House of Commons Energy and Climate Change Committee; in-
dependent bodies such as the Committee on Climate Change (CCC); and
think tanks and information services such as Carbon Brief, the Carbon
Trust and Energy Live News. The research also includes compilation of
statistics, from the World Bank Development indicators’ database and
the UK Oﬃce for National Statistics.
The paper’s structure is as follows. Section 2 discusses evolving
concepts of energy and theoretical perspectives behind ecologically
unequal exchange, including how the notion of consumption-based or
embodied emissions sits within this. Section 3 problematises the mea-
surement of GHG emissions on a territorial and/or production basis for
its failure to account for the nature of embodied energy consumption.
Section 4 examines the example of the UK which is followed in Section
5 with a consideration of the challenges inherent in a more equitable
measurement and allocation of responsibility for consumption-based
emissions. Section 6 concludes.
2. Rethinking energy and embodied emissions
While the standard scientiﬁc and physical deﬁnition of the term
energy means “the capacity do work: that is, to move an object against a
resisting force” (Boyle et al. [90]:6), the term has since become subject
to a myriad of interpretations. These include: as a natural resource e.g
coal; a technology e.g a solar panel; a networked infrastructure e.g a
transmission grid; a commodity that can be bought and sold on the
ﬁnancial markets [27]; and a ‘geopolitical object’, central to discourses
of security and scarcity ([11]:2). Acknowledging such multi-faceted
diversity, in this paper I draw from Marxist concepts of energy as a
social relation “enmeshed in dense networks of power and socio-
ecological change” ([28]:106). Such an approach analyses energy as
embedded within broader social, economic and political forces and
processes and “a particular historical phenomenon inextricably tied up
with unequal exchange” ([15]:102).
As the papers in this special issue demonstrate, concepts of ‘spatial’ in
relation to energy are diverse and wide-ranging. Here, I speak to a spatial
concept of energy by examining how the consumption of energy embo-
died in goods, services and commodities has become thoroughly sepa-
rated and dislocated from its production. Such a separation illustrates the
restructuring of global space in recent decades which, following Smith,
includes processes of uneven development and shifting production across
borders, particularly in the form of industrialisation in low and middle-
income countries and deindustrialisation in high income countries
([29]:122). A spatial examination of energy further includes a con-
sideration of the often under-theorised relationship between energy and
labour. Not least, as the global mobility of capital has enabled the re-
location of industry and technological production (and by consequence
GHG emissions) to other geographical locations ([30]:334) labour has
remained ‘spatially trapped’ ([31]:472).
By adopting such an approach I oﬀer a challenge to the academic
literature1 on the low-carbon transition. While this literature has made
valuable contributions to the understanding of socio-technological change,
energy policy and innovation, it can also be criticised for its spatial
blindness and its implicit overemphasis of “the national level at the ex-
pense of other geographical levels” ([32]:3); for its overriding focus on the
individual in the residential sector as opposed to large energy-intensive
and organisational consumers, which gives us “an unrealistic view into the
kinds of transformation of energy consumption patterns that are needed”
[11]; and for its heavy focus on energy supply as opposed to energy de-
mand and/or the relationship between the two [32,13].
With this in mind, I now turn to embodied emissions as ecologically
unequal exchange.
2.1. Embodied emissions as ecologically unequal exchange
“'Dirty' Industries: Just between you and me, shouldn't the World Bank be
encouraging MORE migration of the dirty industries to the LDCs [Less
Developed Countries]? I can think of three reasons: …” Excerpt from
leaked memo 12 December 1991, by Larry Summers, then World
Bank chief economist,2
In the above citation, Larry Summers, then chief economist at the
World Bank, justiﬁed his proposal for the oﬀshoring of ‘dirty industries’ to
less developed countries on the basis of economic arguments. These in-
cluded: the removal of ‘health impairing pollution’ to the country with the
lowest cost; that poorer countries are ‘under-polluted’; and that the de-
mand for a ‘clean environment for aesthetic and health reasons’ increases
with levels of income. I include this citation here because it rationalises an
economic growth model based on the export of polluting industries to low
and middle-income countries, and the subsequent import of embodied
1 Including socio-technical transitions [86], sustainability transitions [87] and the
energy transition [16].
2 Available: http://www.whirledbank.org/ourwords/summers.html.
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emissions by high-income countries, with blatant disregard for questions
of equity or social justice. While this statement, made 25 years ago would
no longer be endorsed by the World Bank which now counts sustainable
development and climate change among its core priorities, the practice of
outsourcing of emissions still continues in practice.
‘Ecologically unequal exchange’ [5,32–34] merges concepts of
economic ‘unequal exchange’, derived from strands of Marxist political
economy, with concerns from political ecology and ecological eco-
nomics over asymmetric metabolic ﬂows within the capitalist world
system. As I now discuss, while the former focusses on ﬂows of mone-
tary exchange and conﬂicts of economic distribution, the latter is more
concerned with conﬂicts of ecological distribution [35,36]. Conﬂicts
which in both cases are caused by industrial capitalism [5].
Economic unequal exchange, a broad concept subject to various
interpretations and debates (cf [5]), can be summarised as being con-
cerned with: global wage inequality and the labour time embodied in
commodities traded between nations; the relationship between labour,
capital and surplus value, which sees capitalists in high-income coun-
tries exploiting labour in their own country as well as beneﬁtting from
the surplus value produced by labour in less developed countries; and
unequal terms of trade and purchasing power resulting in the transfer of
wealth from less developed to high-income countries. Economic un-
equal exchange draws from various theories of underdevelopment and
uneven development, including dependency theory and world systems
theory [37,38], which asserted that national development could only be
understood within the context of a global system that involves politi-
cally strong ‘core’ countries and their economically strong corporations,
and much weaker and less developed ‘periphery’ countries ([5]:205).
Unequal exchange results from asymmetric ﬂows of surplus value from
the ‘periphery’ to the ‘core’, a relationship exists between as well as
within countries [37].
Though far from united,3 the literature on ecologically unequal
exchange develops concepts of economically unequal exchange by
building on Marxist value theory4 in order to analyse the exploitation
and degradation of natural resources in processes of production and the
biophysical limits of capitalism often ignored by orthodox as well as
heterodox economics approaches [39]. Ecological awareness has not
been systematic within Marxist political economy, which has paid
limited attention to the natural and ecological limits to accumulation
and the relationship between nature, labour and capital. Indeed,
Marxist thought to date has failed to adequately account for the con-
tribution of energy to the capitalist process [11] and the role of energy
consumption in processes of production ([30]:Chapter 15). This in ad-
dition to the by-products or waste, including GHG emissions from fossil-
fuel energy, generated from these processes [40].
In essence, while the surplus extracted from labour and its relation-
ship to capital is central to Marxist value theory, there is limited explicit
consideration of the way in which capital exploits and alienates en-
vironmental and natural resources from nature [40]. Much of the lit-
erature on Marx’s value theory has focussed on ﬁxed capital such as
machines and infrastructure (in which embodied energy plays a funda-
mental role but is in this case invisible) and labour power in the means of
production, but has underplayed the role of energy and raw materials.
Embodied emissions can therefore be considered a form of ecological,
social and economic surplus extraction from low and middle-income
countries, through which high-income consumers “are increasingly ap-
propriating both global natural resources and the sink capacity of
ecological systems” (Vetöné Mózner, [92]:84). Moreover, embodied en-
ergy has essentially replaced “labour in one part of the world with
technologies based on imports of natural resources and embodied labour
from other parts of the world” ([36]:17). Such a lens throws stark clarity
on the inequality inherent in global patterns of consumption and the
global “distribution of purchasing power and environmental degrada-
tion” ([36]:16).
Of further note is that concepts of ecologically unequal exchange
[22] extend far beyond GHG emissions to incorporate other forms of
pollution; the depletion of non-renewable energy and mineral re-
sources; deforestation; and land5 and soil degradation, as well as con-
cepts of carbon and environmental footprint [43,44],6 global environ-
mental space, and ‘environmental load’ [45].
Beyond Marxist political economy, ecologically unequal exchange
also oﬀers a signiﬁcant counterpoint to the limits of mainstream and
environmental economics and the policy often guided by such ap-
proaches, which rarely accounts for the transboundary nature of sys-
tems of production and consumption and the energy and emissions
embodied within them. For example while the environmental eco-
nomics approach recognises nature’s limits, it nonetheless assumes that
environmental problems can be solved by the eﬃcient pricing and
regulation of natural resources, technical innovations, market systems
and well-deﬁned property rights [46].
A popular tool of environmental economics, the Environmental
Kuznets Curve (EKC), though now rather dated, illustrates many of these
assumptions. Under the logic of the EKC, poor and largely agriculturally-
dependent countries generate limited environmental degradation and
pollution which increases as they develop and industrialise but then
decreases once they are past a certain level of wealth as a result of the
introduction of greater eﬃciency and technological innovation.
However, evidence for the EKC is not only limited ([13]:76) but also fails
to recognise that ‘growth-based dematerialisation’ takes places at the cost
of oﬀshoring environmental externalities to poorer countries ([36]:12).
Most obviously, if all countries followed the idealised trajectory from an
agricultural to an industrial to a high-end manufacturing and service
economy, “eventually there would be no further countries to specialise in
material-intensive production” ([91:120).
The failure of climate change policy to recognise the inequality
inherent in methods of production-based accounting and consumption-
based emissions are now discussed in the following section.
3. Problematising the territorial measurements: inequalities of
consumption
The Kyoto framework under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) measures emissions on a ter-
ritorial basis, thereby placing “the burden of emissions reduction on
those countries which produce energy-intensive goods, rather than those
which consume them” ([47]:213). Under the UNFCCC countries are re-
quired to submit national emission inventories (NEI) based on emissions
produced within the territorial boundary of the country in question [8].7
Yet heavy criticism has been levelled at this measurement for its failure
to account for emissions embodied within the import of commodities,
goods and services from abroad, as detailed studies have shown in
3 My discussions on this topic are limited to a broad summary. I acknowledge the depth
and complexity of thought that has been put into understanding the relationship between
biophysics and economics, and interpretations and criticisms of Marx’s concern with the
‘metabolic rift’ between human society and the natural environment. Such thinking in-
cludes various attempts, contested and otherwise, to link and/or challenge Marxist eco-
nomics and ecological economics [88,36], as well as the divisions that can be identiﬁed
between and within these literatures (see for example [36,89,5]).
4 Theories of the creation of proﬁt via the exploitation of labour by capital.
5 The UK is also a net importer of agricultural land, embodied in agricultural products
([45]:54).
6 Note that the total carbon footprint of the UK includes the six main greenhouse gases:
CO2, methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O) and ﬂuorinated compounds. This when com-
pared to the ‘carbon dioxide footprint’ which relates just to CO2 emissions [44].
7 Note that though the terms ‘territorial-based’ emissions and ‘production-based’
emissions are often used synonymously, they are in fact slightly diﬀerent as explored by
Barrett et al. ([23]:452-3). Notably, while the measurement of territorial emissions is
required under the UNFCCC and reported internationally, the measurement of production
based emissions, largely carried out by developed countries, is not. In addition, the former
does not allocate international aviation and shipping to individual countries whereas the
latter allocates such emissions to the country of the relevant vessel’s operator.
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relation to the UK [20,23,7,13]. Moreover the measurement of NEIs does
not account for international transportation including aviation and
shipping [8]. Consequently, NEIs present a wholly inaccurate portrayal
of national impacts and fail to account for the “social, economic and
ecological relations that underpin the experience of consumption”
([14]:4). Energy consumption is therefore inaccurately and inequitably
portrayed within a ‘national scalar frame’ ([14]:825), as a result of which
the environmental and social origins of GHG emissions embodied within
consumer and capital goods go unrecognised [15].
There is therefore a strong case for emissions to be measured on a
consumption basis in addition to a production and/or territorial one
[23]. As Scott and Barrett ([7] :150) argue, consumption-based emissions
accounting oﬀers “underexploited policy interventions and increases the
potential to break down barriers that exist between industrialised and
emerging economies in international climate policy”. However attempts
to measure and integrate consumption-based emissions accounting into
international negotiations have been largely unsuccessful and were
barely mentioned at the UNFCCC conference in Paris [10].
How consumption-based emissions should be calculated and applied
is a relatively new and evolving area in both policy [48] and academic
research [8,23], and the measurements that do exist are rarely treated
as ‘oﬃcial statistics’ (Barrett et al. [23]:453). There are complex
methodological challenges for this calculation, including the realloca-
tion of emissions from technologies to sectors and imports. While work
on this issue is growing, there is signiﬁcant variation in the calculation
of consumption-based emissions as compared to that of production-
based emissions (Vetöné Mózner, [92]). In summary, methodological
challenges include: the complexity of being able to attribute and mea-
sure embodied carbon within international supply chains, time lags in
data availability, an absence of adequate time series data, a lack of
publicly available data in some countries and/or regions, and diﬀering
opinions over where the boundaries for measurement should lie
[49,20]. Consequently there is signiﬁcant scope for uncertainty [8] and
estimates vary depending on methodology and data availability, which
so far makes it diﬃcult to undertake cross country comparisons. In the
absence of an agreed international standard, signiﬁcant diﬀerences
exist across countries in terms of the quality, sectors and time frames
represented and in the ability to match emissions data with economic
sectors (cf [20]:15). However, the multi-regional input-output 8 model
of emissions (MRIO) in global trade, supported by emissions data from
the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) [6,8,43], despite the limita-
tions posed by its complexity and lack of transparency.
There is also a point of contention in identifying who the polluter
actually is [50]. For example “in the case of the construction of a fac-
tory, who should be attributed emissions from the initial construction of
the building? The ultimate consumers of the goods produced by the
factory? Or the owners of that factory?” ([42]:21).
A further challenge is the inadequacy of data to measure inequality
of consumption and emissions within countries ([42]:20). This, in ad-
dition to how emissions embodied in ﬁnancial investments including
bonds, sovereign wealth funds and pension funds should be accounted
for if those investments are in turn channelled into carbon-intensive
activities.
These dynamics are now discussed in relation to the UK in the fol-
lowing section.
4. Consumption-based emissions: the case of the UK
In the UK, industrial direct GHG emissions have halved since 1990 (CCC
2016:120) and the country is now one of the world’s least energy-intensive
economies. The UK’s territorial GHG emissions have declined signiﬁcantly
in recent decades and by 35 per cent since 1990 ([51], see Fig. 1).
Key reasons for this include a shift from coal to gas and increased
renewable energy generation in the electricity sector (CCC 2016); en-
ergy eﬃciency in the transport and domestic sectors; fuel switching and
increased energy eﬃciency in the industrial sector; a shift towards less
carbon-intensive manufacturing; and an overall decline in industrial
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Fig. 2. Energy consumption by ﬁnal user for industry, transport & domestic, UK
(1980–2014).
Source: ONS [51].
8 Though the original purpose of input-output analysis was to analyse inter-de-
pendencies between economic sectors and trading economies, in this case it has been
developed for the investigation of environmental factors ([20]:12).
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activity and associated energy consumption, particularly since 1970
([53]:28).
The UK’s industrial sector, which includes the manufacturing and
construction sectors, reﬁning of petroleum products and activities
linked to energy supply (extraction and production of oil, gas and solid
fuels) ([54]:118), now accounts for only 17 per cent of the country’s
total ﬁnal energy consumption at approximately 24 million kilo tonnes
of oil equivalent (Ktoe) ([53]:28, see Fig. 2) and is responsible for al-
most a quarter of the country’s GHG emissions [56], less than transport
and domestic consumption. The UK has de-industrialised faster than
any other developed country and its manufacturing performance has
been weak compared to other industrial competitors in terms of re-
search and development, expenditure on capital equipment and share
of global manufacturing exports [57]. Yet in consumption terms the UK
is increasingly energy-intensive and emissions-intensive. Between 1993
and 2010 the country’s consumption-based emissions grew by 16 per
cent while its production emissions fell by 19 per cent ([20]:26). By
2010 the UK’s consumption emissions were nearly 80 per cent higher
than its production emissions, compared to 35 per cent higher in 1993
([20]:23, see also Fig. 3).
Securing “ambitious international action on climate change” and
the cost eﬀective reduction of domestic carbon emissions was one out of
four objectives of DECC’s 2015–2020 ﬁve year departmental plan [59].
Yet despite this, and a number of apparently progressive developments
that have been introduced in the UK in recent years in order to comply
with national targets for GHG emissions reduction, such commitments
deal exclusively with territorial emissions and consumption-based
emissions do not feature. These commitments include: a government
commitment to set legally binding targets to reduce national GHG
emissions to 80 per cent of 1990 levels by 2050 under the 2008 Climate
Change Act; the Low-carbon Transition Plan launched in 2009 with a
target to produce 30 per cent of the UK’s electricity from renewables by
2030; the 2011 Carbon Plan, which anticipates a reduction in per capita
ﬁnal energy consumption of 31–54 per cent by 2050; and the 2014
National Energy Eﬃciency Action Plan and Building Renovation
Strategy (NEEAP), which includes various policy measures to increase
energy eﬃciency in the domestic, commercial and public sectors.
The adoption of the ﬁfth carbon budget in June 2016, a requirement
under the 2008 Climate Change Act, sets the UK on a legally-binding
path to cut emissions by 57 per cent compared to 1990 levels by 2032,
despite criticisms and serious doubt as to whether such a target could be
reached.10 In 2016 electricity generation from solar PV exceeded that of
coal during the months of May and July for the ﬁrst time, with six per
cent of total generation coming from solar PV and less than four per
cent from coal [60]. UK coal use has been falling rapidly and fell to its
lowest level since the industrial revolution in 2014 [61].
While the UK does produce ﬁgures on consumption-based emissions
(see for example [44,62]), there are no signs that these will be in-
corporated into national policy. This despite reports produced by the
UK House of Commons Energy and Climate Change Committee in 2012,
and the Committee on Climate Change [20], both of which argued that
the UK government should explore options for setting national level
targets on a consumption basis.
The clear rise over time in the import of emissions via goods, ser-
vices and commodities into the UK as well as the majority of OECD
countries, demonstrates the interdependencies that exist between em-
bodied energy consumption at the national level with production chains
across borders. The shifting nature of the source of these emissions is
also signiﬁcant, reﬂecting the emergence of China as the world’s largest
manufacturing economy, the leading exporter of consumer goods and
the world’s top emitter since 2006 ([30]6:329). Notably emissions
imported into the UK from outside European OECD countries rose by
nearly 60 per cent between 1993 and 2010 ([7]:152) and China now
accounts for 20 per cent of the UK’s imported emissions ([44]:5).
In 2004 the emissions generated in China for the production of goods
consumed in the UK were higher than all the direct emissions of UK
households, including gas and car fuel at over 81 million tonnes of CO2e
([63]:19). Of these emissions, over 43 per cent are associated with elec-
tronic equipment and textiles. More generally, China’s emissions exports
grew by 320 per cent between 1990 and 2010 ([20]:30). And because
China’s electricity sector is twice as carbon intensive as that of the UK’s due
to its heavy reliance on coal-ﬁred power, the emissions embodied in pro-
ducts made in China are much higher than they would be if the product
were made in the UK ([63]:21, [6]). Notably, it is estimated that China’s
power sector emits almost seven times as much CO2 per pound of economic
output as the UK (the [20]:29) and there are eight times more emissions
embodied in China’s exports than its imports ([6]:202). Not only does the
“magnitude and growth of emissions embodied in Chinese trade pose a
dilemma for trade and climate policy” ([6]:201) but also raises signiﬁcant
questions with regards to how carbon-intensive production is embedded in
Fig. 3. Greenhouse gas emissions associated with UK consumption
(1997–2013). Million tonnes CO2 equivalent.
Source: DEFRA [44].9
9 Note that due to uncertainties in the emerging methodology, DEFRA [44] classiﬁes
this data as ‘experimental’.
10 The UK government sets its carbon budgets in consultation with the Committee on
Climate Change (CCC) which sees only for a 50 per cent probability of achieving a 2 °C
limit [10,52]. Although the UK has complied with “the ﬁrst round of Kyoto targets set
under the UNFCCC and is well underway to comply with the second phase target”
([7]:152), commitments under the Climate Change Act are insuﬃcient to meet the level
of ambition expressed in the 2015 Paris climate change agreement to limit global tem-
perature rise to below two degrees C.
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capital stock elsewhere, including in power stations, energy transmission
and distribution systems and the transport sector, and how this should be
accounted for in policy and economics.
However, while China’s coal-fuelled, export-led economic develop-
ment model now puts it in the lead as the world’s largest emitter since
2006, and its per capita production emissions at 6.7 metric tonnes in
2013 have almost doubled since 1995, they are still much lower than
those of the USA at 17 metric tonnes and just below those of the UK at 7
metric tonnes (see Figs. 4 and 5).
Meanwhile, recent evidence suggests that China is becoming less
energy-intensive as it moves towards a service-based, consumption-or-
iented economy, with production of some sectors shifting to other
countries in East Asia and the Paciﬁc, including Vietnam and Indonesia,
and South Asia such as India and Bangladesh [64]. Such a shift serves to
exempliﬁes two issues. Firstly, the response of globally mobile, export-
oriented capital and foreign direct investment (FDI) to increased labour
costs, unionisation, and labour and environmental regulations that have
accompanied recent industrial shifts in China, has been to go in search
of lower-cost, semi-skilled labour (and therefore greater proﬁt) else-
where ([30]:327–366). Secondly this shift illustrates the problematic of
the EKC discussed above in that the reduction or stabilisation of emis-
sions in one country via the oﬀshoring of heavy industry, is likely to
result in an increase in another [65] paralleled by the increased frag-
mentation in production and associated material ﬂows.
The concept of ‘carbon leakage’ [65], a term referring to the “loss of
competitiveness of trade-exposed and carbon-intensive industries” lo-
cated an industrialised country subject to climate mitigation require-
ments ([10]:103) is also relevant to this discussion. Following the logic
of ‘carbon leakage’ a high-income country’s emission reductions are
achieved at least in part via the oﬀshoring of production. Such a move
inevitably contributes to the rise in emissions elsewhere, generally in a
country not constrained to the same level of climate change mitigation
commitments. However rather than as a direct result of climate and
energy policy, carbon leakage has largely occurred as an unintended
consequence of international trade ﬂows (Peters, 2010) and rising la-
bour costs. In addition to the methodological problems of measurement
discussed in section 3, this raises uncomfortable and complex questions
as to how responsibility should be allocated as I now discuss.
5. ‘Polluter pays’? Towards a spatial and relational approach to
the energy transition
Clearly a ‘reallocation of responsibility’ (cf [30]:331) from produc-
tion-based to consumption-based accounting is thoroughly necessary.
But beyond this general consensus, how should this responsibility be
addressed and allocated? From a policy perspective at least, little
thought has been dedicated to this, and that which has largely been
focussed on trade and border carbon adjustments [2].
Helm is quite categorical that “the polluter is the consumer, not the
producer” ([47]:221) and therefore carbon emissions “should be mea-
sured on a consumption not production basis” ([47]:p. 224). However,
while behavioural change and personal responsibility play a role in
reducing emissions, restricting the focus to individuals, particularly at
the household level, fails to tackle political, industrial and economic
structures and conﬁgurations over which the individual consumer has
little, if any, control. As Sorrell ([13]:79) cautions, focussing on au-
tonomous decision making by individuals neglects how their pre-
ferences and behaviours are “embedded in and shaped by broader”
socio-technical systems. Moreover, a binary perspective that pits the
individual or even industrial consumer against the producer in re-
sponsibility terms impedes a more comprehensive understanding of
energy consumption in its embedded and dispersed form throughout
global supply chains, and therefore a more radical challenge to it.
Secondly, the individualisation of responsibility for reducing emis-
sions risks exacerbating inequalities between high-income and low-in-
come consumers [67], whereby those with greater purchasing power
are more able to absorb any additional monetary costs of carbon re-
sponsibility or carbon reduction incentives. One example of this is the
feed-in tariﬀ for solar PV in the UK, the beneﬁts of which have mainly
accrued to homeowners with suﬃcient capital to pay for the upfront
costs of installation, while the overall costs have a “been spread across
all households as additional costs on bills (Grover, 2013)” (in Eyre and
Lockwood [68]:21). Similarly, low-income consumers may be shamed
or ﬁnancially penalised for consumption activities that are deemed
high-carbon, such as driving old cars, simply because they cannot aﬀord
to do otherwise. Tackling the issue of responsibility therefore raises the
question of how to avoid the politics of condemnation and the ‘vanity-
oriented virtue politics’ of self-denial and sacriﬁce ([67]:828).
Thirdly, and as a challenge to Helm’s assertion, the term ‘consumer
pays’ is not synonymous with that of ‘polluter pays’. Without an
awareness of the more fundamental determinants of supply and de-
mand within the complexity of economic systems, the nature of own-
ership and processes of production may end up being overlooked. This
invokes deeper questions over who owns the means of the production
and how related patterns of consumption are determined [30].
Developing concepts of the core and periphery discussed in Section 2, a
key challenge therefore is to address how emissions from commodities,
goods and services arise across complex and geographically dispersed
supply chains involving a variety of intermediate stages and the fact that
environmental costs and responsibilities are often eschewed during the
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Fig. 4. Total greenhouse gas emissions by country (kt of CO2 equivalent).
Source: adapted from World Bank development indicators: trends in
greenhouse gas emissions.11
11 Available: http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/3.9.
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production and the pollution it generates are processes far more often than
a singular event or action that occurs in one location alone.
Understanding this question in practical terms therefore requires a
consideration of actors and forces beyond national (e.g UK) and re-
gional (e.g EU) borders in order to better understand many of the sig-
niﬁcant transnational dynamics and spatial interdependencies that may
aﬀect and determine any potential low-carbon transition. As DEFRA
argues, in order to understand the eﬀect that UK consumption has on
GHG emissions “we need to take into account where the goods we buy
come from and their associated supply chains” [44]. Such an argument
resonates with Allwood et al’s ([69]:85) ambitious call to understand
“the full directory of who’s involved and why” and “where does the
money involved in ﬁnal purchase eventually ﬂow?”, and Scott and
Barrett’s ([7]:154) assertion that the scope of emissions reductions
should reﬂect the UK’s role as “an industrialised global consumer” and
account for net emissions embodied in trade. This brings us back to the
literature on the low-carbon transition and the need to take a closer
look at “the geographical unevenness of transition processes from the
perspective of global networks and local nodes” ([70]:968).
Two approaches may be useful here, neither of which have yet
engaged with questions of energy and emissions in any great depth but
which I put forward as areas for future research. Firstly, the Systems of
Provision approach sees the connection between initial production and
ﬁnal consumption as a vertically integrated ‘chain of activities’ [71,21].
As Fine argues, “what gets produced must more or less get consumed”
([72]:222) and that it is generally the producer that dominates over
consumer policy. There is therefore a need to restore “production to a
position of prominence” ([72]:p. 233). Secondly, the literature on
Global Production Networks (GPNs) [73,74,31] may also help to fa-
cilitate a more spatially-aware understanding of embodied energy and
emissions, for its consideration of forces and factors that transcend
national regimes and jurisdictions, and less evident power structures
and networks.
6. Conclusion
This paper has argued that not only is the measurement of territorial
and/or production emissions at the national level a case of ecologically
unequal exchange, but also an inadequate and arbitrary spatial scale of
analysis [45]. Despite the important role played by the national-level,
technology-focussed perspective of much of the energy policy and
transitions literature to date, in isolation it risks presenting an “un-
realistic view into the kinds of transformation of energy consumption
patterns that are needed” ([24]:333). Consequently, a deeper analysis is
necessary that allows for a more distributional awareness of energy
demand and consumption, and associated GHG emissions.
Energy consumption therefore, needs to be “approached through a
wider lens focussed on institutions and sectors” ([11]:7), with more
attention given to the growing separation of systems of production and
consumption, in particular the acknowledgement that emissions are
generated in one, or indeed several countries by one or many ﬁrms, for
the beneﬁt of consumers in another and that dematerialisation on one
side of the world may directly or indirectly result in the relocation of
energy-intensive production elsewhere. This includes unpacking the
simplistic assumptions often made about the relationships between
energy consumption, carbon emissions and economic development;
focussing on underlying processes that drive geographies of energy
demand; and examining the role of large organisational producers and
consumers.
As this paper has demonstrated, tackling energy demand is as much
an issue of bargaining power in trade, FDI, foreign policy, industrial
strategy and international relations as it is domestic policy on energy
eﬃciency and demand reduction. And understanding the allocation of
responsibility in the case of embodied energy and embodied emissions
is as much an area for climate, energy and environmental policy as it is
for theoretical discussions of global distribution [36]. Therefore beyond
policy there is a need to look at structures and processes, relating to
Bradshaw’s claim, that “The problems at Copenhagen suggest a need to
spend less time on setting long-term targets that few can agree on,
let alone achieve, and more time on understanding the relationship
between energy demand, economic growth and carbon emissions”
([1]:7).
Given the dual concern of ecologically unequal exchange with both
socio-economic and ecological inequality, I argue that greater con-
sideration should be given to concepts of embodied labour in parallel to
concepts of embodied energy and emissions. This would include types
of labour which, like nature and energy, are not accounted for within
formal systems of capitalist production such as unpaid work of women.
While an in depth discussion of the role of labour and wage inequality
in relation to embodied emissions went beyond the scope of this paper,
it is identiﬁed as a key priority for future research. Rather than a zero-
sum game between ecological stewardship and labour rights, with one
being prioritised at the expense of the other, those concerned with the
low-carbon transition and those concerned with labour exploitation
should seek to understand the interaction and interdependence between
ecological and socio-economic inequalities. Doing so would go some
way to respond to calls for a concepts of a transition that is at once just
and low-carbon [75,76].
Finally, the low-carbon energy transition, in addition to a techno-
logical process, is also a geographical one, “that involves reconﬁguring














Fig. 5. CO2 emissions metric tonnes per capita.
Source: Adapted from World Bank Development Indicators Database.12
12 Available: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.PC.
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well as relationships both within countries and regions, and between
them. For a comprehensive understanding of the low-carbon transition,
matters of energy demand and consumption must be situated within a
broader geopolitical and socio-economic context [1] that is at once
spatial and relational. Such a focus enables us to pose “systemic ques-
tions about the relationship between energy, geography and society”
([11]:12) and the inevitable implications and challenges this poses for
contemporary policy-making.
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